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RECENT DECISIONS
An exclusionary result is a precise fact of science worthy of conclusiveness.32
The principal case represents a logical, realistic approach: the jury deter-
mines only whether the tests were accurately performed. If it finds that they
were accurately performed, exclusion of paternity follows irresistibly. If it
finds that the tests were inaccurately performed, that finding can stand
only if there is evidence to support it3 Thus, the tests were virtually con-
clusive evidence. This decision is representative of the progressive ac-
ceptance of the validity of blood test results. Slowly, this medico-legal
mechanism is achieving the evidentiary stature it merits.?'
FignmucK K. DIXON
JUDGMENTS - VACATION AFTER TERM FOR FRAUD
Appellant sought by equitable attack after term to vacate for fraud a
divorce decree obtained by appellee against appellant, alleging that at the
time of the divorce trial the appellee was still married to a previous husband.
Appellant had learned of the previous marriage at about the time the action
for divorce was brought, but did not assert the defense during the trial.
Held: The fraud alleged constituted intrinsic fraud, for which a judgment
will not be vacated; and appellanes failure to assert his knowledge
of the bigamous marriage during the trial constituted a total lack of dili-
gence.1
The general rule that a judgment will be vacated after term for extrinsic
fraud, but not for intrinsic fraud, is well settled.2 However, extrinsic fraud
'Note, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rnv. 156 (1948).
'The evidence in Jordan v. Davis, 57 A.2d 209 (Me. 1948), (motion for new
trial overruled), showed that the tests had been performed under the direction of
Doctor Hooker, an authority in blood grouping research. Yet the court held that
the jury should be allowed to find that technical error had been made. In the prin-
cipal case, decided one year later, blood tests were performed under the direction of
the same Doctor Hooker and the court held that if the jury found technical error
in the making of these tests, it was mere conjecture.
" Perhaps the next step is the enactment of statutes making an exclusionary blood
test result a complete defense in bastardy proceedings. Maguire, supra note 18, at
174. It has also been proposed that a National Scientific Commission should be
formed to establish appropriate criteria to insure the reliability of all scientific proof;
statutes then should provide that scientific evidence conforming to the Commis-
sions's standards is prima fade evidence in relevant proceedings. Smith, Scientific
Proof, 52 YALE L. 3. 586 (1943).
1 Chermak v. Chermak, 88 N.E.2d 250 (Ind. 1949).
'Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Kingsbury, 175 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1949);
Josserand v. Taylor, 159 F.2d 249 (C.C.P.A. 1946); Thomas v. Hunter, 78 F. Supp.
925 (D. Kan. 1948); Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 25 Pac. 970 (1891); Michael
v. American National Bank, 84 Ohio St. 370, 95 N.E. 905 (1911); Kenney v.
Kenney, 76 N.E.2d 918 (Ohio App. 1946); Metzger v. Turner, 195 Okla. 406,
158 P.2d 701 (1945); 1 FREEMAN, JUDGmENs § 233 (5th ed. 1925). Gen-
erally, a judgment will be vacated only for fraud practiced by or at the solicitation of
the successful party. 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 1238 et seq. (5th ed. 1925). Also,
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and intrinsic fraud are terms incapable of exact definition. The term
"extrinsic fraud" purportedly refers to fraud which denies to the unsuccess-
ful party a trial on the merits, by preventing him from knowing that suit has
been brought, or by inducing him not to contest the action, or by mislead-
ing him so that he is ignorant of a defense available to him.3 Thus, extrinsic
fraud was found to exist where a husband obtained a default judgment in
an annulment proceedings against his wife after leading her to believe that
he had abandoned the action; 4 where a default judgment was obtained by
telling an adversary that "there would be a friendly suit" to clear title;5 and
where a default judgment was procured by bribing the opposing party's
attorney to stay away from court." Intrinsic fraud, however, relates to
fraudulent acts which hinder the correct determination of an issue con-
tested in the original action.7 The giving of perjured testimony8 and the
fraudulent introduction into evidence of forged documents9 are the most
common examples of intrinsic fraud.
Early American cases granted vacation of judgments obtained by means
of intrinsic fraud.'10 The modern rule denying vacation stems from United
States v. Throckmorton.1" In that case the government sought vacation of
a judgment, charging that the defendants had obtained it by introducing
forged documents and perjured depositions in evidence. The Supreme
Court denied relief, asserting that endless litigation would result from a con-
trary holding."2 A later Supreme Court case, Marshall v. Holmes," granted
generally, only a party to a judgment may obtain vacation. 1 id. § 258. For ex-
ceptions, see 1 id. § 260 et seq. General equitable considerations govern the grant-
ing of equitable relief from judgments. See RESTATEMENT, JuDGMENTS § 127
et seq. (1942).
'Extrinsic fraud is also called "fraud in the procurement." Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Jenkins 91 F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1937); Crain v. Crain, 205 S.W.2d 897 (Mo.
App. 1947).
4Bloomquist v. Thomas, 215 Minn. 35, 9 N.W.2d 337 (1943).
'Jones v. Arnold, 221 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. 1949).
'People v. Perris Irig. Dist., 142 Cal. 601, 76 Pac. 381 (1904).
"U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878); Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 25 Pac. 970
(1891); Garcia v. Ramos 208 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
'La Salle v. Peterson, 220 Cal. 379, 32 P.2d 612 (1934); Rent-a-Car Co. v. Globe
and Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 166 Md. 447, 171 Ad. 350 (1934); Old Nat. Life Ins.
Co. v. Patillo, 195 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
'Old Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Patillo, supra note 8.
"McGehee v. Gold, 68 II. 215 (1873); Seward v. Cease, 50 II. 228 (1869);
Laithe v. McDonald, 12 Kan. 340 (1873); See Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 7
Cranch 332, 336 (U.S. 1813).
U98 U.S. 61 (1873).
"Accord, Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 25 Pac. 970 (1891); Maryland Steel Co. v.
Marney, 91 Md. 360, 46 Ad. 1077 (1900); Kenney v. Kenney, 76 N.E.2d 918
(Ohio 1946). Other objections to allowing vacation have been announced. La
Salle v. Peterson, 220 Cal. 379, 32 P.2d 612 (1934) (complainant had his oppor-
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vacation on facts similar to those of the Throckmorton case. Lower federal
courts have reached conflicting results in attempting to follow either the
Throckmorton case or the Marshall case or both.' 4 The more recent cases,
however, show a tendency to follow the Throckmorton case.'5 Later
Supreme Court decisions have failed to darify the position of that CourtjO
The state courts are almost uniform in strict adherence to the general
rule that a judgment obtained by intrinsic fraud will not be vacated. 7 Thus
statutes which authorize the setting aside of judgment after term for fraud
tunity at the trial to make the truth appear); Crain v. Crain, 205 S.W. 2d 897 (Mo.
App. 1947) ("every man should have his day in court- not two days"); Maryland
Steel Co. v. Marney, supra (the losing party too frequently is willing to accuse his
adversary of perjury).
" 141 U.S. 589, 12 Sup. Ct. 62 (1891).
' See Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1939) (declaring that there is
an irreconcilable conflict between the two cases); Thomas v. Hunter, 78 F. Supp.
925 (D. Kan. 1948) (ignoring the Marshall case); Martin v. Sheeley, 67 F. Supp.
689 (D. Alaska 1946) (citing the Marshall case as following the Throckmorton
case); Graver v. Faurot, 64 Fed. 241 (7th Cir. 1892); Josserand v. Taylor 159
F.2d 249 (C.C.P.A. 1946) (stating that there is no conflict).
'Independence Lead, Mines Co. v. Kingsbury, 175 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1949);
Bradburn v. McIntosh, 159 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1947); Josserand v. Taylor, 159
F.2d 249 (C.C.P.A. 1946); Thomas v. Hunter, 78 F. Supp. 925. (D. Kan. 1948);
Martin v. Sheely, 67 F. Supp. 689 (D. Alaska 1946).
" Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 421, 43 Sup. Ct. 458, 464
(1923); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 Sup. Ct.
997 (1943) (granting equitable relief from a judgment obtained in part by in-
troduction in evidence of spurious documents). See Josserand v. Taylor, supra note
15 (stating that the Hazel-Atlas holding did not abrogate the existing rule). How-
ever RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 126, comment c (Supp. 1948) has been modi-
fied because of the Hazel-Atlas case. The comment now suggests that equitable
relief will be granted where a judgment is obtained by the introduction in evidence
of false documents "knowingly procured" by the successful party or his attorney.
The comment also suggests that relief will be granted from a judgment obtained by
perjured testimony knowingly procured by the successful party or his attorney.
This latter suggestion was made in view of Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189
S.W.2d 284 (1945). Most cases have denied relief for subornation of perjury.
La Salle v. Peterson, 220 Cal. 379, 32 P.2d 612 (1934); Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal.
129, 25 Pac. 970 (1891); Maryland Steel Co. v. Marney, 91 Md. 36, 46 Ad. 1077
(1900); Nesson v. Gilson, 224 Mass. 212, 112 N.E. 870 (1916); Crouse v. Mc-
Vickar, 207 N.Y. 213, 100 N.E. 697 (1912). Contra: Fair v. Tampa Electric Co.,
158 Fa. 15, 27 So.2d 514 (1946).
'See Note, 126 AL.R. 390 (1940). There is less strictness in applying the rule
to judgments on arbitration awards. Johnson v. Wells, 72 la. 290, 73 So. 188
(1916); Fire Association of Philadelphia v. Allesina, 49 Ore. 316, 89 Pac. 960
(1907). See Note, 99 A.L.R. 1198 (1935); 49 HARV. L. REv. 327 (1935)
Contra: Jacobowitz v. Metselaar, 268 N.Y. 130, 197 N.E. 169 (1935) (to permit
vacation would defeat the purpose of arbitration which is to avoid the delay and
expense of litigation); Fernandez Grain Co. v. Hunter, 217 Mo. App. 187, 274
S.W. 901 (1925) (the parties in informal proceedings assume the risk which re-
sults from absence of formal legal safeguards).
19503
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
have been interpreted to apply only to extrinsic fraud,- and even where
perjury is expressly stated by statute to be sufficient to justify setting aside a
judgment, Minnesota courts have refused relief where the perjury was
"intrinsic" - that is, perjury which occurred at the trial - without indicat-
ing for what acts in the nature of perjury the statute would justify vacation.' 9
Ohio by statute permits vacation of a judgment for perjury, but only where
conviction of the perjurer for the offense is shown.20
Denial of relief from judgments obtained in intrinsic fraud has been
criticized severely.2' The reason advanced by most courts for denying
vacation - that endless litigation would result 22 - is seemingly refuted by
the experience in Wisconsin, where vacation for intrinsic fraud is per-
mitted.2 3 Only two cases seeking vacation on the ground of intrinsic fraud
have appeared before the Wisconsin Supreme Court since 1934.14 In addi-
tion, it should be observed that the rule as generally applied rewards skill-
fulness in the concealment of intrinsic fraud until after the term of court
has expired.2 5
Some courts, perhaps sensitive to the extreme inequities which may
result from a strict application of the rule, have expressed approval of it, but
evaded its effect by treating clear cases of intrinsic fraud as "extrinsic."2
Other courts have encountered difficulty in attempting conscientiously to
apply the rule because the terms "intrinsic fraud" and "extrinsic fraud" have
not been dearly defined. 27 It may be suggested that the traditional discre-
"Manning v. Manning, 206 Ark. 425, 175 S.W.2d 982 (1943); Stout v. Derr, 171
Okla. 132, 42 P.2d 136 (1935).
"Bloomquist v. Thomas, 215 Minn. 35, 9 N.W.2d 337 (1943); Bell v. Jordan,
199 Minn. 53, 271 N.W. 104 (1937) (to warrant vacation, the fraud must be
such as to affect the jurisdiction of the court, or prevent a party from appearing or
presenting his defense).
2"Omio GEN. CoDE § 11631-10.
"See Note, 126 A.L.R. 390, 394 (1940).
See note 12 supra; Rent-a-Car Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 166 Md. 447,
171 At. 350 (1934); Michael v. American National Bank, 84 Ohio St. 370, 95
N.E. 905 (1911).
"Amberg v. Deaton, 223 Wis. 653, 271 N.W. 396 (1937); Federal Life Ins.
Co. v. Thayer, 222 Wis. 658, 269 N.W. 547 (1936).
'See note 23 supra. See Comment, 23 CAL. L. Rnv. 79 (1934), in which the
writer observes that only four cases concerning intrinsic fraud were before the Wis-
consin Supreme Court from 1914 to 1934.
"For other criticisims see Laithe v. McDonald, 12 Kan. 340 (1873); Laun v. Kipp,
155 Wis. 347, 145 N.W. 183 (1914); see Metzger v. Turner, 195 Okla. 406, 409,
158 P.2d 701, 705 (dissent); Comment, 23 CALIF. L. REv. 79 (1934); 22 HARV.
L. REV. 600 (1909); Note, 126 A.L.R. 390, 394 (1940).
"Bolden v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel Co., 215 Ala. 334, 110 So. 574 (1925) (perjured
testimony at trial); El Reno Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Stratton, 41 Okla. 297, 137 Pac.
100 (1913) (same).
"Compare Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Callicote, 267 Fed. 799 (8th Cir. 1920)
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